

TARRYING ON THE LORD: AFFECTIONS, VIRTUES AND
THEOLOGICAL ETHICS IN PENTECOSTAL PERSPECTIVE

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ABSTRACT

As Pentecostals begin to inquire what might constitute Pentecostal theology, the matter must also arise as to what constitutes Pentecostal ethics, both as a matter of logical sequence and as a necessity given the historical and theological links the Pentecostal movement has with the Holiness movement of the nineteenth century. Both areas must be localized in the context of Pentecostal worship, and essential to the field of ethics are the affections and virtues, two moral frameworks that have proven useful for Christian moral reflection. Rather than choosing one or the other, Pentecostals can employ these frameworks in a complementary manner, for each framework has particular accents that are crucial for describing how the moral life takes shape and is sustained. The author employs the activity of ‘tarrying’ from Pentecostal worship as a metaphor for the Pentecostal vision of the moral life in order to show how Pentecostals may continue to embody distinctively their eschatological vision of God at a time when they are negotiating competing allegiances as they emerge as a sub-tradition within Christianity.

In a seminal and interdisciplinary article, Don Saliers states that ‘the relations between liturgy and ethics are most adequately formulated by specifying how certain affections and virtues are formed and expressed in

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the modalities of communal prayer and ritual action'.¹ Saliers' account is thought-provoking in that it calls for a reconsideration of faith and the moral life as integrally related to worship; hence, 'there is an internal, *conceptual* link between liturgy and ethics'² that must be taken into account if one is to give a coherent and adequate portrayal of each enterprise.³

Noticeably missing from Saliers' argument, however, is a treatment of the logic behind the affections and the virtues. Rather than admitting the possible tensions and contradictions of these two ethical frameworks, Saliers proceeds with his argument as if these were synonymous categories.⁴ If pushed further, Saliers might respond by stating that these two categories are not synonymous but complementary to one another; this generalization might be true, but one is left wondering how they might be so, given their varied methodological presuppositions and constitutive elements.⁵ If a comparison between these two paradigms were undertaken, their similarities and differences would be more evident, which would lead to the potential viability for each within the conceptualization of the Christian moral life.

A comparison between the affections and virtues would be helpful for Pentecostals in particular, given that their emerging 'tradition'⁶ implies a

1. Don Saliers, 'Liturgy and Ethics: Some New Beginnings', *Journal of Religious Ethics* 7.2 (Fall 1979), pp. 173-89, (175).

2. Saliers, 'Liturgy and Ethics', p. 174.

3. Naturally, if there is a dichotomy between liturgy and ethics, something is already wrong, for these kinds of dichotomies are indicative of presuppositions regarding the limits one places on the formative nature of the church's practices. For a general survey of the difficulties regarding the process of relating worship and ethics, see Samuel Wells and Stanley Hauerwas (eds.), *The Blackwell Companion to Christian Ethics* (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2004), especially chapter 1.

4. Saliers couples the two categories at several points: 'The Christian life can be characterized as a set of affections and virtues', 'The Christian moral life is the embodiment of those affections and virtues which are intentional orientation of existence in Jesus Christ', and 'Affections and virtues grounded in the saving mystery of Christ constitute a way of being moral' ('Liturgy and Ethics', p. 179).

5. Some scholars seem to think that there is no distinction between the two categories, as the case seems to be with Robert C. Roberts when he states that virtues can be both emotions and 'strengths' or 'skills of psychological self-management' (*Spirituality and Human Emotion* [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1982], pp. 12, 15).

6. It is not insignificant at this point in Pentecostalism's history that the prominent Pentecostal scholar Vinson Synan can change the title of one of his works from *The Holiness-Pentecostal Movement in the United States* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1971) to *The Holiness-Pentecostal Tradition* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997).

significant shift of emphasis: from a movement that was scattered throughout the world to a more structurally defined group of denominations. This shift is a natural development⁷ but one that introduces a number of issues, including what it means to articulate (theology) and embody (ethics) those distinctive (not unique) aspects of the Christian faith that gave rise to the movement in the first place. In other words, thoughtful Pentecostals will come to ask, ‘What is Pentecostal theology?’ as well as ‘What is Pentecostal ethics?’⁸ because both issues are integrally related to sustaining a viable Pentecostal identity.

Whereas the former question has been raised at significant points,⁹ the latter has yet to receive adequate attention, an unfortunate oversight given that the Pentecostal movement is historically and theologically linked to the ethically-focused Holiness movement of the nineteenth century.¹⁰ Especially for those denominations that retained a strong emphasis on the theme of sanctification, issues surrounding practical ‘commitments’ or ‘prohibitions’ used to be quite predominant, particularly in the forms of dress and specific behaviors. As time has passed, however, these actions generally have been considered to be outdated and legalistic,¹¹ and if the Holiness

7. The suggestion that the move to denominations was a ‘natural’ one might be contested by those who believe Pentecostals were forced to form denominations because they failed to reform preexisting ones. See D. William Faupel, ‘Whither Pentecostalism?’, *Pneuma: Journal of the Society for Pentecostal Studies* 15 (Spring 1993), pp. 9-27, (22).

8. In speaking of ‘Pentecostal ethics’, I am referring to the category of ‘theological ethics’ as distinct from (but not opposed to) the field known as social ethics. I take the former category to imply the theological articulation of the embodied Christian faith and the latter to emphasize issues of mission and social concern. Whereas the former field has been less pronounced in Pentecostal reflection, the latter has been pioneered by the work of Murray W. Dempster. For an important contribution in this latter field, see his ‘Christian Social Concern in Pentecostal Perspective: Reformulating Pentecostal Eschatology’, *JPT* 2 (April 1993), pp. 51-64.

9. Some recent exemplifications of this move are Dale M. Coulter, ‘What Meaneth This? Pentecostals and Theological Inquiry’, *JPT* 10 (October 2001), pp. 38-64 and Terry L. Cross, ‘The Rich Feast of Theology: Can Pentecostals Bring the Main Course or only the Relish?’, *JPT* 16 (April 2000), pp. 27-47.

10. This assumption can be made on the basis of the historical and theological explorations of the movement by Donald Dayton (*Theological Roots of Pentecostalism* [Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1987]) and D. William Faupel (*The Everlasting Gospel* [JPTSup, 10; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1996]).

11. This generalization is true in the more affluent societies of the West; however, in other parts of the world, one still can find these emphases on the outward forms of

movement is generally granted to be 'dead',¹² certainly the influence of this movement for the particular identities and practices of Pentecostal denominations might be 'dead' as well. If this state of affairs is accurate, then Pentecostals generally have a vacuum when acknowledging ways of embodying their faith commitments, for the traditional means of sustaining an identity apart from and in witness to the world has been discounted, leaving one to wonder, 'What does one replace these prohibitions with? How are Pentecostals different from the world?'¹³ Essentially, an antinomian tendency can be detected among certain Pentecostal groups in their overreaction to legalistic concerns,¹⁴ thereby swinging the pendulum of heretical possibilities to the other (and possibly more dangerous)¹⁵ side.

If Pentecostals are to avoid the tendencies of both legalism (in which the external overshadows the primary, internal reality of the believer) and antinomianism (in which there is no correspondence between the internal reality and external expression of Christian existence), then a broader elaboration of what is distinctively Pentecostal ethics is in order. Given Saliers' remarks concerning the interrelationship between liturgy and ethics, Pentecostals might find an account of the affections and the virtues as a helpful means by which to start the conversation of how they may understand and embody distinctively their faith commitments within a pneumatological context of worship.

An elaboration of the particular methodological premises and conceptual elements associated with the affections and virtues is necessary in order

holiness. This disparity leads one to question what kind of cultural 'redemption and lift' effect has taken place among third and fourth generation Pentecostals in the West and what effects this development has had on their understanding of Pentecostal identity within a fallen (yet increasingly more attractive) world.

12. For a suggestive article along these lines, see Kenneth J. Collins, 'Why the Holiness Movement is Dead', *Asbury Theological Journal* 54 (Fall 1999), pp. 27-35.

13. These questions are paraphrases of concerns raised by a former professor of mine, R. Hollis Gause.

14. This analysis of contemporary Pentecostalism is widespread; one figure who has diagnosed the situation similarly is Henry H. Knight III, 'From Aldersgate to Azusa: Wesley and the Renewal of Pentecostal Spirituality', *JPT* 8 (April 1996), pp. 82-98, (96).

15. For all of the legalistic abuses associated with certain prohibitions by certain Pentecostal groups surrounding dress and activities that were considered 'worldly', it is theologically commendable that these Pentecostals were trying to negotiate their faith commitments with the particularities of how they carried on their lives in the world. One wonders if this kind of negotiation exists when antinomianism is the heretical tendency, leaving open the question of how can one differentiate oneself from being *in* the world and yet *not of* it.

that the particular similarities and distinctive contributions of each framework might be assessed. Once that particular endeavor is achieved, one can proceed to demonstrate how each ethical framework might contribute to the ongoing task of discerning what might constitute a Pentecostal ethic,¹⁶ an activity that is worthwhile if Pentecostalism is to retain an ethos that is both reminiscent of its early years as a movement and also a sustainable identity in the face of the ongoing realities of institutional complexity.

The Affections: Sheer Emotionalism?

‘True religion, in great part, consists in holy affections.’¹⁷ How can this statement be true when affections merely denote variability and inconsistency? Would not emotional states be limited in their applicability for theological ethics because of their very nature? These questions stem from certain presumptions about the affections that are contrary to some of their more comprehensive and detailed accounts. One of the chief proponents of religious affections, Jonathan Edwards, makes the all-important distinction between the affections and the passions, the latter being more sudden and overpowering in their effects on the mind.¹⁸

For Edwards and other proponents of this particular framework, the religious affections are ‘the more vigorous and sensible exercises of the

16. Some work already has been undertaken to apply these frameworks within Pentecostalism. The affections play a significant role in Steven Land’s *Pentecostal Spirituality* (JPTSUP, 1; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1993), a work that will receive more treatment below. The virtues are less pronounced within Pentecostal scholarship; an early article that begins the conversation is Paul W. Lewis, ‘A Pneumatological Approach to Virtue Ethics’, *Asian Journal of Pentecostal Studies* 1.1 (1998), pp. 42-61. As with all theological works that attempt to break new ground, these particular examples require further engagement and critique, which will be constitutive of the task at hand.

17. Jonathan Edwards, *The Works of Jonathan Edwards*. II. *Religious Affections*, (ed. John E. Smith; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), p. 95. This particular phrase was approved by another exponent of the affections, namely John Wesley. For an investigation into Wesley’s use of Edwards’ *Treatise*, see Gregory S. Clapper, ‘“True Religion” and the Affections: A Study of John Wesley’s Abridgment of Jonathan Edwards’, *Treatise on Religious Affections*, *Wesleyan Theological Journal* 19 (Fall 1984), pp. 77-89.

18. Edwards, *Religious Affections*, p. 98. Wesley makes a similar distinction between affections and passions in different contexts; see Gregory S. Clapper, *John Wesley on Religious Affections* (Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, 1989), pp. 53-55.

inclination and will of the soul'.¹⁹ Noting the limits of language, Edwards states that in some ways there are no differences between the will and inclination of the soul, and yet there is a difference in their 'degree and manner of exercise' when speaking of the affections.²⁰ Edwards mentions a number of examples to prove this differentiation between inclinations of the soul and the affections, in each case qualifying the latter with the necessity of existing to 'a considerable degree'.²¹

Rather than belaboring the details of the inner dynamics of religious experience, Edwards believed that 'conversion is best studied in terms of its effects rather than its means', thereby leading him to consider the affections as providing 'the most ascertainable index of these effects'.²² Edwards knew that a real conversion would produce effects that were evident to those willing to notice, and he legitimately believed there was a certain uniformity to these effects.

Additionally, Edwards believed that the same Spirit who was operative in the conversion of a believer would render certain common characteristics of this activity among all who were saved; some of these effects include desire, fear, hope, gratitude, and the foundation of all the affections, love.²³ In fact, these effects are the markers or signs that help believers discern whether the Spirit or some other influence is operating in a particular instance. The context of Edwards is important for understanding the emphasis he gave to discernment, for Edwards witnessed both the spiritual vibrancy and the emotional aberrations associated with the Great Awakening; consequently, Edwards wished to grant a place for religious experience but only within the parameters of certain criteria that aid in the discernment of the Holy Spirit's activity.

John Wesley, too, was an exponent of religious affections or 'tempers'. For Wesley the affections had an inner and outer component that maintained a balance between one's receptive and active roles in response to God's grace. According to Clapper, Wesley understood the affections as rising 'from the person's being directed, focused, or fixed on some object' and as disposing individuals 'to behave in certain ways'.²⁴ For an affection to be

19. Edwards, *Religious Affections*, p. 96.

20. Edwards, *Religious Affections*, p. 97.

21. Edwards, *Religious Affections*, p. 97.

22. William J. Scheick, *The Writings of Jonathan Edwards* (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 1975), p. 88.

23. Edwards, *Religious Affections*, p. 108.

24. Gregory S. Clapper, 'Orthokardia: The Practical Theology of John Wesley's Heart Religion', *Quarterly Review* 10 (Spring 1990), pp. 49-66, (51).

truly a religious affection, it must follow at least two criteria: (1) the principal object must be God and (2) the resulting actions must come from hearts that have been transformed by God in order that their intentions might be pure and holy. Only within this context can one see the manner in which ‘right works require a right heart and a right heart requires right works’.²⁵

This brief portrayal of the religious affections proves that there are many advantages associated with this framework, thereby justifying its place within a Pentecostal context of ethical reflection. First, the religious affections attempt to render a picture of Christian existence that includes both the mind and the will. If the Christian life were one constituted merely by reflection and speculation, there would be something terribly missing from its account of human existence. The activity of human knowing, especially in the case of knowing God, requires an orientation of both the intellectual and affective aspects of human selves, for ‘knowledge of God is always gained through love and fear of God’.²⁶ Although this epistemological presupposition is not congenial to highly abstract and disengaged forms of knowing, one realizes that the knowledge of God must be of a different order than other forms of knowing.

Second, the religious affections have their origin in the person of Christ and are actualized by the activity of the Holy Spirit. One cannot aspire to the religious affections by one’s own means and works, for these affections require the activity of the Holy Spirit to render them operative in the believer. These affections are grounded in Christ, for they are ‘dispositions in response to or in imitation of Christ...’²⁷ Only after the prevenient activity of God can subsequent talk of works and human striving be considered. Edwards speaks of the affections at times as being synonymous with the fruits of the Spirit mentioned in Scripture, a fact which only adds to the important claim that the Spirit’s presence and operation must bear subsequent marks/signs for others to recognize.

Third, the inculcation and formation of the affections arise from a context of worship, for this activity is the one in which God is the principal object. Such an emphasis makes an old maxim of the church—*lex*

25. Clapper, ‘*Orthokardia*’, p. 53. A clear example of this understanding is Wesley’s comment on Jas 2.22 in the *New Testament Notes*: ‘Works do not give life to faith, but faith begets works, and then is perfected by them’ (as quoted in Clapper, ‘*Orthokardia*’, p. 54).

26. Don E. Saliers, *The Soul in Paraphrase* (New York: Seabury Press, 1980), p. 10.

27. Knight, ‘From Aldersgate to Azusa’, p. 97.

orandi, lex credendi—a viable notion for today. Only in the particular context of prayer and adoration can belief be formed and sustained.²⁸ If this understanding is true with regard to belief, it is true with regard to embodiment as well: any way of thinking about the Christian moral life abstracted from the enlivening and capacitating presence of God is futile, for in worshipping God we come to behold the object that orients and disposes us properly. One learns to love God by beholding Him and communing with Him.

Fourth, the affections provide a schematized structure of discernment for what constitutes true and false religion. As noted above, this advantage was the principal reason why Edwards wrote the *Treatise on Religious Affections* in the first place; revivalism has a way of getting out of control because of human zeal, and the affections were for Edwards and others a way of distinguishing those fruits that accompanied the true workings of God. When one communes with God, one cannot leave that experience unchanged; therefore, the affections function as ways to avoid fanaticism while advocating a place for emotional correspondences to religious experience.

The particular strength of the religious affections is that the activity of the Spirit is emphasized in the way believers' hearts are changed and transformed to be more disposed to God. In emphasizing the transformative nature of God's presence and activity, the affections underscore the initial working of God and the subsequent fruit and effects those experiences foster. In both Edwards and Wesley, one detects the affections as functioning to form one's character or dispositions so that the affections require a notion of 'habituation'.²⁹ The importance of 'habituation' cannot be devalued at

28. For an elaboration of the 'material interplay' between worship and doctrine as hinted by the Latin tag mentioned above, see Geoffrey Wainwright, *Doxology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980).

29. In the case of Edwards, one finds statements such as, 'The Author of the human nature has not only given affections to men, but has made 'em very much the spring of men's actions' (*Religious Affections*, p. 100) and 'But it is doubtless true...that the essence of all true religion lies in holy love; and that in this divine affection, and an habitual disposition to it, and that light which is the foundation of it, and those things which are the fruits of it, consists the whole of religion' (*Religious Affections*, p. 107). Gregory Clapper gestures some similarity between the affections and virtues by stating, 'The dispositional nature of the affections makes them more like virtues than feelings' (*John Wesley on Religious Affections*, p. 85), but he later mentions that the affections are more helpful than the virtues because they are 'transitive' in nature and engage the heart more than the virtues. Randy Maddox makes a similar claim when he states that

this point, for human activity itself characterizes human beings and their subsequent activity. In the case of the believer, a change in heart implies a sustained change in one's actions, for actions are not only indicative of internal influences and transformations but are themselves constitutive of the maintenance and viability of those internal conditions. Despite mentioning 'habituation' from time to time, usually articulations of the affections insufficiently take into account this way in which humans are characterized. For an elaborate account of this understanding, one must move to the realm of virtue ethics in that this context is the one that gave rise to the notion in the first place.

The Virtues: What Does Azusa Have To Do with Athens?

If the affections suffer the consequences of being understood as synonymous with emotions when considered for their viability within Christian ethics, a Christian appropriation of the virtues faces perhaps an even more formidable task because of their association with Hellenistic philosophy. After all, what does a pagan framework of ethical inquiry have to do with the particular requirements of Christian living as outlined by Scripture? Is not the Johannine and Pauline literature markedly different from the *Nicomachean Ethics*?

These questions and a host of other critiques and reservations by Christian scholars have been leveled at what has come to be known as a revival in the field of virtue theory.³⁰ Generally, this re-appropriation within the academy has come to be characterized as a neo-Aristotelianism that takes into account the limits of ethical reflection associated with modern forms of moral inquiry.³¹ This renewed appreciation for the category of the

Wesley advocated 'habituated holistic affections' that placed him close to Aquinas, but the terminology of 'virtue ethics' does not, in his opinion, 'highlight the *responsive* aspect of Wesley's moral psychology as clearly as does using his own more typical language of the affections' ('A Change of Affections: The Development, Dynamics, and Dethronement of John Wesley's Heart Religion', in Richard B. Steele (ed.), *Heart Religion in the Methodist Tradition and Related Movements* [Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2001], p. 16). The general critiques offered by Clapper and Maddox in regard to virtue ethics are insufficiently attentive to the details associated with Christian narrations of the virtues, a point elaborated below.

30. For a good outline of the various arguments used against virtue theory and a sustained argument for its use in Christian ethical reflection, see Joseph J. Kotva, Jr, *The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1996).

31. These limits are usually illustrated within the context of Alasdair MacIntyre's

virtues has led many Christian thinkers to consider the importance of certain categories such as ‘practices’,³² ‘narratives’, and ‘tradition’ as well as to reevaluate some aspects of historical theology that had been neglected for some time. Specific inquiries have demonstrated that the category of virtue was very important for many of the fathers of the early church,³³ and of course, one cannot help but reexamine within a resurgent Aristotelianism the masterful and epochal appropriation of ‘the Philosopher’ by Thomas Aquinas in the *Summa Theologica*, a work that has been important for both Roman Catholic and Protestant moral reflection.

The *Secunda Pars* of the *Summa* is of significant interest to the task at hand because of its reformulation of virtue theory within a larger context of Christian reflection.³⁴ Rather than merely copying Aristotle, Aquinas adopts the concept of *habitus* and incorporates it within a larger canopy of Christian embodiment.³⁵ To understand the assumptions with which

‘disquieting suggestion’ in *After Virtue* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2nd edn, 1984), pp. 1-5.

32. By ‘practices’ at this particular juncture, I am referring to the MacIntyrean sense of the term, which is ‘any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended’ (*After Virtue*, p. 187). More about practices (particularly Christian practices) will be mentioned below. For works that engage MacIntyre from a particularly Christian perspective, see Nancey Murphy, Brad J. Kallenberg and Mark Thiessen Nation (eds.), *Virtues and Practices in the Christian Tradition* (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 1997) and Jonathan R. Wilson, *Living Faithfully in a Fragmented World* (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 1997).

33. For a brief survey of the patristic category of virtue for the purposes of engaging Eastern Orthodoxy with neo-Aristotelianism, see Joseph Woodill, ‘Virtue Ethics and its Suitability for Orthodox Christianity’, *St. Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly* 41.1 (1997), pp. 61-75.

34. The oversight of Thomas’ project in Lewis’ article (‘A Pneumatological Approach to Virtue Ethics’) is unfortunate, especially given that the title points to the possible integration of the Spirit’s activity in a framework of a theory of virtue, which is a move that is very explicit in Thomas’ treatment of the virtues and the gifts.

35. The tendency to equate the Latin term for virtue (i.e. *habitus*) with the popular term ‘habit’ has been detrimental to the popularization of virtue theory, to the point that Servais Pinckaers wrote a very helpful article to dispel this assumption; see his ‘Virtue is not a Habit’, *Cross Currents* XII (Winter 1962), pp. 65-81. The ‘one serious defect’ of the term ‘habit’ is that it ‘encompasses the idea of automatic activity’, thereby implying ‘the diminution, if not the total exclusion, of reflective consciousness and

Aquinas is working, though, one must understand the basics of this concept within its Aristotelian articulation.

Aristotle begins his definition of virtue by stating that there are two sorts of virtue: virtue of thought and virtue of character. 'Virtue of thought arises and grows mostly from teaching; that is why it needs experience and time. Virtue of character results from habit.'³⁶ The virtues are neither contrary to human nature nor part of it but agreeable to it in that one can acquire them; in fact, one must acquire the virtues in order that one's natural ends might be fulfilled or completed. The manner in which these virtues are acquired is analogous to the manner one obtains a craft: 'For we learn a craft by producing the same product that we must produce when we have learned it; we become builders, for instance, by building, and we become harpists by playing the harp. Similarly, then, we become just by doing just actions, temperate by doing temperate actions, brave by doing brave actions.'³⁷ The logic of habituation gains its intelligibility from the assumption that, 'a state [of character] results from [the repetition of] similar activities'.³⁸

The notion of character, or *hexis*, is a complicated issue to unravel, but what is certainly clear is that *hexis* is very much bound to virtue, or *arete*. This relationship is illuminated when one realizes that Aristotle, 'like Plato, thinks of the question of moral philosophy as not simply how I am to conduct myself in my life, but how I am to become the kind of person readily disposed so to conduct myself, the kind of person for whom proper conduct emanates characteristically from a fixed disposition'.³⁹ The dynamism of moral formation within this context is as follows: one performs a just act (to take one example) in imitation of a just person until gradually those acts begin to form one's character so that subsequent just acts are

voluntary decision...' ('Virtue is not a Habit', p. 67). If one thinks of virtues in this way, they actually would function to diminish moral character, thereby 'depriving [one's] action of its properly human value' ('Virtue is not a Habit', p. 68).

36. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* (trans. Terence Irwin; Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2nd edn, 1999), p. 18.

37. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, p. 19.

38. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, p. 19.

39. L.A. Kosman, 'Being Properly Affected: Virtues and Feelings in Aristotle's Ethics', in Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), *Essays on Aristotle's Ethics* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1980), p. 103. Kosman's article is especially interesting in that it deals with how the feelings and virtues interrelate, concluding that for Aristotle feelings might not be completely in one's control, but they nevertheless stem from one's character, which can be cultivated.

naturally precipitated by a stable disposition towards justice.⁴⁰ This dynamic aids in the task of narrating human action, for just because an act appears just does not mean that it is so; if the act is to be a just one, it must spring from a character, a *hexis*, disposed to justice; in other words, one must *be* a just person in order to perform just acts.⁴¹ Aristotle succinctly summarizes the matter by stating,

But for actions in accord with the virtues to be done temperately or justly it does not suffice that they themselves have the right qualities. Rather, the agent must also be in the right state of mind when he does them. First, he must know [that he is doing virtuous actions]; second, he must decide on them, and decide on them for themselves; and, third, he must also do them from a firm and unchanging state.⁴²

To remain with the previous example, one must know one is performing a just act as one is doing so (one cannot stumble upon a just act ignorantly and later claim it was just); one must perform the act for the sole reason that it is a just act (thereby excluding the possibility of ulterior motives); and one must perform the act from a stable character/disposition (one must be a just person in order to perform just acts).

Thomas Aquinas follows for the most part Aristotle's understanding of habituation; however, important differences exist between the two figures. One example of this difference is when Aquinas introduces the important distinction between one's natural and supernatural ends. The matter receives initial form in an important part of the *Prima Secundae*,

As Augustine says, *the soul needs to follow something in order to give birth to virtue; this something is God: if we follow Him we shall live aright.*

40. Aristotle is aware that this form of reasoning implies a certain level of circularity, but this feature of his project needs not be taken to weaken his arguments, for one of the interesting aspects about Aristotle's project for contemporary readers is that he 'begins his ethics decidedly from "somewhere"' (Stanley Hauerwas and Charles Pinches, *Christians among the Virtues* [Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997], p. xiii).

41. Such an understanding of morality tends toward the *being* rather than the *doing* aspects of moral formation, a distinction that tends to garner significant attention by Christians. Gilbert C. Meilander states the matter this way: 'An ethic of virtue turns away not only from an overemphasis on borderline cases but also from the concept of duty as the central moral concept. *Being* not *doing* takes center stage; for what we ought to do may depend on the sort of person we are. What duties we perceive may depend upon what virtues shape our vision of the world' (*The Theory and Practice of Virtue* [Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984], p. 5).

42. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, p. 22.

Consequently the exemplar of human virtue must needs pre-exist in God, just as in Him pre-exist the types of all things. Accordingly virtue may be considered as existing originally in God, and thus we speak of *exemplar* virtues... Again, since man by his nature is a social animal, these virtues, in so far as they are in him according to the condition of his nature, are called *social* virtues... It is in this sense that we have been speaking of the virtues until now. But since it behooves man to do his utmost to strive toward even to Divine things... we must needs place some virtues between the social or human virtues, and the exemplar virtues which are Divine.⁴³

Aquinas creates a space between what he terms the social and the exemplar virtues for a state of Christian existence that he finds correlated with the perfecting and the perfect virtues. In teleological fashion, the perfecting virtues are for those believers 'who are on their way and tending towards the Divine similitude', while the perfecting virtues are found in those 'who have already attained to the Divine similitude', namely those who are Blessed or who are 'at the summit of perfection'.⁴⁴

The distinction between one's natural and supernatural ends receives further treatment when Aquinas begins to speak of the theological virtues,

Man is perfected by virtue, for those actions whereby he is directed to happiness... Now man's happiness is twofold... One is proportionate to human nature, a happiness... which man can obtain by means of his natural principles. The other is a happiness surpassing man's nature, and which man can obtain by the power of God alone, by a kind of participation of the Godhead, about which it is written that by Christ we are made *partakers of the Divine nature*.⁴⁵

Aquinas is introducing a distinction in humanity's ends in order to show the distinction between those virtues associated with good living and others that are associated with approaching the Divine similitude; hence, one cannot approach one's supernatural ends just by fostering the social virtues; rather, through the activity of God one is capacitated to approach one's supernatural ends through the infusion of what are known as the theological virtues, namely faith, hope, and charity.⁴⁶

43. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica* (hereafter, *ST*), I-II, q. 61, art. 5, ans. The referenced translation of the *Summa* is the five-volume edition of the Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Allen, TX: Christian Classics, 1948).

44. *ST*, I-II, q. 61, art. 5, ans.

45. *ST*, I-II, q. 62, art. 1, ans.

46. Obviously, these three theological virtues are taken from 1 Cor. 13.13.

Aquinas effectively creates at this point the possibility for the activity of the Holy Spirit to capacitate believers with the theological virtues and the gifts of the Holy Spirit. Rather than being the scholastic, overly rational account that critics make of the *Summa*, Thomas' project demonstrates a sensitivity to spiritual growth that includes a synergistic account of God's capacitating role within the nexus of human action and habituation. This sensitivity plays out in the difference between the theological virtues and the gifts; whereas the theological virtues direct us to our supernatural ends and have God as their principal object, the gifts function to make one more 'amenable to the Divine inspiration'.⁴⁷ As with the theological virtues, the gifts are infused, yet these gifts perfect one for acts higher than acts resulting from the virtues. Aquinas realized that to be moved by God, to be more sensitive to His inspiration, required greater capacities than those suggested by the virtues;⁴⁸ nevertheless, by integrating the virtues in his argument, Thomas skillfully demonstrates that moral formation begins and ends with God, yet this process is not done without human participation in the form of cultivating one's faculties and character.

Many advantages present themselves from Aquinas' re-conceptualization of Aristotelian virtue theory. Aquinas demonstrates a picture of the moral life in which the capacities of human nature are perfected both naturally and supernaturally; he attempts to demonstrate the necessity of realizing human capacities while affirming that humans can only go so far to achieve their true and ultimate happiness. The notion of habituation helps clarify the manner in which actions can be narrated and understood appropriately within the Christian moral life; rather than suggesting a works-righteousness, Thomas' model clarifies that one's actions influence one's character, and proper activity is required from those who wish to approximate their ends. Aquinas' portrayal of the moral life is attentive to the complexity and vastness of these ends, both natural and supernatural.

47. *ST*, I-II, q. 68, art. 1, ans. The particular gifts Thomas has in mind are the seven mentioned in Isa. 11.2-3.

48. Thomas uses different categories for delineating the virtues; a helpful summary is found in *ST*, I-II, q. 68, art. 8, ans., where he states, 'The theological virtues are those whereby man's mind is united to God; the intellectual virtues are those whereby reason itself is perfected; and the moral virtues are those which perfect the powers of appetite in obedience to reason. On the other hand the gifts of the Holy Ghost dispose all powers of the soul to be amenable to the Divine motion.'

For Aquinas the purpose of the virtues is to change us, to ‘allow us to participate in our end by becoming one with that end’,⁴⁹ namely, God.⁵⁰ In speaking of virtues, one might think that the issue would be self-mastery or self-control, but in broad perspective, Thomas believes the virtues ‘prepare us to rely on an agency other than our own’.⁵¹ This interpretation is supported by the manner in which Thomas takes charity to be the form of the virtues, a vision that implies the more we grow in the virtues, ‘the more defenseless we are before God’.⁵² This particular vision of the moral life gives Thomas’ account of the virtues its significant quality for Christian morality.

Modern Moral Reflection and the Pentecostal Dilemma

Having surveyed the particular tenets of the ethical frameworks normally considered as the religious affections and the virtues, I believe one can see that these two categories have many similar and complementary features when embodied within particular narrations of Christian embodiment. Whereas the religious affections emphasize the necessity of an inner transformation that can be wrought only by the presence of the Holy Spirit, the virtues demonstrate the necessity of habitually sustaining those capacities that exist in us naturally and subsequently supernaturally in order that these may increase in the approximation of their proper ends. When considered together, these two frameworks can provide a portrayal of the Christian life that begins with God’s prevenient activity and continues with the call to work out one’s own salvation.

These particular moral frameworks have proven helpful for Christians in narrating and enacting their faith, which is constantly in tension with the moral presuppositions of the age; the same can be true for modern Pentecostals who are struggling to sustain a viable identity in contrast to the world. Within this struggle, Pentecostals face the danger of either complying or

49. Paul Wadell, *Friends of God: Virtues and Gifts in Aquinas* (New York: Peter Lang, 1991), p. 97.

50. Because of the place Thomas gives to ‘deification’ in his ethical project, the generalizations that judge his work has having no implications for inner change or transformation are inattentive to this particular tenet of his *corpus*. For a treatment of deification as found in Aquinas and Palamas, see A.N. Williams, *The Ground of Union* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).

51. Wadell, *Friends of God*, p. 121.

52. Wadell, *Friends of God*, p. 122.

aligning themselves with the particular assumptions of the moment or of alienating themselves from engaging those assumptions. Whereas the latter seems to have been the particular route taken by many early Pentecostals, the former option is becoming more and more prevalent among Pentecostals who have 'arrived' to a certain level of economic and social status. This particular development is especially troubling, given that many of these tendencies are contrary and detrimental to certain prevalent characteristics of the Pentecostal ethos that would be significantly important for any articulation of a 'Pentecostal ethic'.

In the modern world, focus upon ethical matters largely has centered on particular 'cases' or 'catch-22' situations in which a problem is posed and the resolution of the dilemma indicates the level of 'moral development' one has achieved.⁵³ The basic form of this engagement usually surrounds a generic question, 'What would you do if...?'⁵⁴ This kind of situational or quandary ethics⁵⁵ divorces the agent from any context that enables the discernment of the intelligibility of moral acts, thereby leading one to a deontological form of ethics in which 'duty' and 'obligation' are the central tenets.⁵⁶

53. I am thinking here of the work of Lawrence Kohlberg, among others. This kind of process naturally fosters the assumption that ethics is only about these kinds of quandaries, thereby making ethics something compartmentalized from the rest of our lives. As Paul Wadell argues, 'if we notice morality only when we have problems, there is so much we do not notice at all' (*Friendship and the Moral Life* [Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989], p. 19). In other words, one who follows this description of morality fails to understand how one's entire life is morally characterized.

54. This question forms the title of one of John Howard Yoder's works, *What Would You Do?* (Scottsdale, PA: Herald Press, 1992). This work attacks many of the assumptions associated with this generic question and offers alternatives that take Christian discipleship and pacifism seriously.

55. For a substantial argument against quandary ethics, see Edmund Pincoffs, 'Quandary Ethics', in Stanley Hauerwas and Alasdair MacIntyre (eds.), *Revisions: Changing Perspectives in Moral Philosophy* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), pp. 92-112.

56. This moral framework usually is associated with Kant and the utilitarians. Although each group is decidedly different, they do share 'the common assumption that ethics, first and foremost, should embody an adequate theory of moral obligation derived from, or involving in a fundamental manner, rules and principles. They differ only about what single principle best supports and orders our rule-determined obligations' (Stanley Hauerwas, *The Peaceable Kingdom* [Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983], p. 20).

There are several problems with this line of moral reflection. Through the divorce of agent and action, deontological ethics assumes that a universal order to morality exists, one that all know and can agree upon. This universal order sometimes is demonstrated through the ‘orienting concerns’ or ‘single principles’ by which moral decisions can be made. By assuming these fundamental principles, however, deontological modes of moral reflection hide the fact that they participate in broader frameworks of assumptions and values; in other words, in trying to advance a ‘rational’ or ‘public’ ethic, deontological ethics actually participates within a particular articulation of value and meaning.

Additionally, the divorce of agent and action leads to an unbearable responsibility upon the agent to ‘do the right thing’, thereby making ethical reflection a task that is threatening and anxiety-laden rather than enabling to one’s life. Part of this anxiety stems from the fact that within this scheme one arbitrarily chooses those principles that will form one’s particular account of morality.⁵⁷ As Stanley Hauerwas points out, this approach bears the seeds of its own destruction because it fails to notice that the free choice of these principles actually operates to undermine their value.⁵⁸ Another reason for the anxiety-laden stigma surrounding moral reflection has to do with the framing of problems themselves. Through the divorce of the agent and action, many theorists fail to notice that the problems one encounters and the way one describes them depend largely on the type of person one has become.⁵⁹ To phrase the matter another way, certain events only present themselves as problematic once they prove to be in conflict with the assumptions and descriptions that constitute the particular elements of the narrative of which one is a part.⁶⁰

Given the difficulties of the current moral assumptions of liberal democratic societies (which are largely deontological), Pentecostals in particular

57. In addition to anxiety, this kind of understanding leads to a lonely sense of freedom; by choosing what constitutes the moral life, we cannot help but notice its ‘awful arbitrariness’ and the fact that ‘the only warrant we have for holding [those things we feel most deeply about] is that they happen to be our own’ (Wadell, *Friendship and the Moral Life*, p. 14).

58. Hauerwas, *The Peaceable Kingdom*, p. 117.

59. Hauerwas, *The Peaceable Kingdom*, p. 119.

60. Hauerwas uses the example of abortion to prove this point; in critiquing the ‘old morality’ within Catholic moral theology, he states, ‘it was forgotten that “abortion” is not merely a description of a set of facts, but a mode of construing the world correlative to a people’s convictions’ (*The Peaceable Kingdom*, pp. 117-18).

(given their present state of theological and identity formation)⁶¹ run the risk of becoming and forming others into good ‘democratic liberals’ rather than ‘faithful Pentecostal Christians’ because of their ‘historical amnesia’⁶² in relation to their narrative traditions.⁶³ In abandoning previous embodiments or ‘markers’ for sustaining a viable identity distinct and contrary to the world’s presuppositions, some Pentecostals find themselves in a vacuum for making the crucial distinctions between what constitutes being a ‘Pentecostal Christian’ and being a pagan. If modern Pentecostals (in opposition to their earlier counterparts) dress like the world, behave like the world, and in large part share the same values as the world, what characterizes Pentecostals as different from the wider society?⁶⁴

61. For an extension of the metaphor of adolescence as applied to Pentecostalism, see Cheryl Bridges Johns, ‘The Adolescence of Pentecostalism’, *Pneuma: Journal of the Society for Pentecostal Studies* 17 (Spring 1995), pp. 3-18.

62. ‘Historical amnesia’ is an affliction that forfeits the future because it implies the loss of the past; as Luke Timothy Johnson states, ‘The real business of tradition is not the securing of the past, but the ensuring of the future. Only when we know how the story has run to this point can we responsibly decide how the plot might now develop’ (*Decision Making in the Church* [Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1983], p. 31).

63. An obvious example of this process is the way Pentecostal groups changed their views on war during the years surrounding World War I. Many groups were resistant to participation in the military because it was understood that they belonged to another ‘celestial’ army; unfortunately, some groups now leave this matter to ‘individual conscience’, which is a move that is in total conformity to a modern Enlightenment understanding of rationality and individuality. For a treatment of this issue with regard to the Assemblies of God, see Roger Robins, ‘A Chronology of Peace: Attitudes toward War and Peace in the Assemblies of God: 1914–1918’, *Pneuma: Journal of the Society for Pentecostal Studies* 6 (Spring 1984), pp. 3-25. One sees an even more pronounced shift in the Church of God (Cleveland, TN), where many originally suffered persecution (and at least one suffered death) for pacifist convictions; see Mickey Crews, *The Church of God: A Social History* (Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee Press, 1990), pp. 108-137.

64. Through these comments, I am trying to highlight some of the concerns raised by Harvey Cox in ‘Some Personal Reflections on Pentecostalism’, *Pneuma: Journal of the Society for Pentecostal Studies* 15 (Spring 1993), pp. 29-34, (34), where he mentions some of the problems of modern Pentecostals as being conformity to the world, excessive reliance on verbal inerrancy, ‘super’ patriotism, and gender and racial discrimination. In all of these cases, Pentecostals inordinately have relied upon other groups or movements to inform their articulation and understanding of these issues rather than engaging in a reconfiguration and re-narration of the debate by means of the resources within the Pentecostal ethos itself.

These circumstances press the importance of beginning a Pentecostal ethic (as with any Christian ethic) not with the question, ‘What should I do?’ but with the following questions: ‘(1) Who am I? Who ought I to become? (2) What kind of attitudes and what kind of actions can lead me to what I ought to become? (3) What kind of community can help me attain the ideal to which I am called?’⁶⁵ If modern Pentecostals were to engage seriously these latter questions with their particular ‘sub-tradition’⁶⁶ in mind, their way of thinking about themselves and their manner of engaging the world would be much more critically aligned to the characteristics and intentions of the movement’s founders, a gesture that does not imply a reification of the past but acknowledges its necessary implications for the tradition’s present embodiment.⁶⁷ Although all three sets of questions are interrelated, Pentecostals can benefit the most from an articulation of the affections and virtues in answering the second question regarding what attitudes and actions can facilitate the approximation of their purpose or *telos* as a group. To begin this exploration, one must move to the initial concern of this essay, namely the interrelationship between worship and ethics.

Theological Ethics in the Pentecostal Tradition: Tarrying on the Lord

To harken back to Saliers’ article, there cannot be a conceptual divide between Christian ethics and Christian worship, for ‘*How* we pray and worship is linked to *how* we live—to our desires, emotions, attitudes, beliefs, and actions’.⁶⁸ Part of the warrant for suggesting this link rests upon the fact that when ‘worship occurs, people are characterized’.⁶⁹ For Pentecostals, the ‘conceptual link’ between worship and ethics is the Holy Spirit’s

65. This phrasing is Livio Melina’s particular summary of MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, pp. 204-225 in *Sharing in Christ’s Virtues* (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America, 2001), p. 23.

66. I am here using the language of Nancey Murphy in order to underscore the relationship Pentecostalism has to Christianity and to maintain a sensitivity to the distinctiveness of the movement. See *Virtues and Practices in the Christian Tradition*, p. 31.

67. These implications include the facts that the movement (1) began among individuals who were considered by the society at large to be poor and uneducated, (2) was self-consciously understood and promoted as a movement anticipating the ‘end-times’ consummation of all creation, and (3) was much more integrated with respect to race and gender in its early, incipient years than in its present embodiments.

68. Saliers, ‘Liturgy and Ethics’, p. 174.

69. Saliers, ‘Liturgy and Ethics’, p. 175.

presence and activity—a reality that changes, transforms, quickens, and crucifies all that is not in conformity with God’s nature in order that the creation might be ‘re-created’ in a ‘time-between-the-times’ encounter with the Wholly Other. For early Pentecostals, a conceptual divide did not exist between worship and ethics nor between private and public life; all of these subsequent distinctions and categories that compartmentalize life were incoherent to early Pentecostals, for they saw all of their life within an integrated scheme that originated in the context of God’s altering and transforming presence. Perhaps unbeknown to them, early Pentecostals ‘effectively sacramentalized the divine power by locating it within their own bodies, within time and space’.⁷⁰ This notion of the self as ‘sacramental’ was supported by the manner in which tongues came to be understood by Pentecostals: an external, bodily sign of the inward presence and activity of the Spirit;⁷¹ all holdouts, all things that were resistant to God’s presence were publicly defied in a moment in which God ‘sacramentalized’ one’s body.

In order to elaborate this particular understanding of Pentecostal worship, I hope to offer a metaphor for Pentecostalism’s vision of the moral life that extends from an especially distinctive activity of Pentecostal worship, namely the act of ‘tarrying on the Lord’. In Pentecostal worship, tarrying implies travailing, waiting, prostrating, and submitting oneself before the presence of God in hopes that God’s presence might break forth in the mundane and profane circumstances of life. Tarrying is an embodiment and demonstration of human desire in search of being ordered by God’s very presence.

As a metaphor for the moral life, tarrying implies a vision of living ‘in between the times’, in the tension of the ‘already/not yet’. Tarrying is anticipatory and so eschatological in form because it is a practice that expects encounter; it beckons eschatological time and in doing so focuses one’s life on the in-breaking presence of the Spirit of God, thereby anticipating the coming reign of Christ. The notion of tarrying is especially helpful for conceiving the moral life because it suggests both ‘passive’ and ‘active’ dispositions; while tarrying on the Lord, one is led by the Spirit to

70. Grant Wacker, *Heaven Below: Early Pentecostals and American Culture* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), p. 108.

71. For a work exploring the sacramental nature of tongues, see Frank Macchia, ‘Tongues as a Sign: Towards a Sacramental Understanding of Pentecostal Experience’, *Pneuma: Journal of the Society for Pentecostal Studies* 15 (Spring 1993), pp. 61-76.

wait actively for the transforming presence of God that makes possible one's faithful existence in the world.

In a more pronounced 'passive' manner, believers awaiting and experiencing the presence of God are formed and shaped by Him in conformity to His image. This vision implies the transformation of one's desires and dispositions through the inculcation and cultivation of the affections. As Steven Land suggests, Pentecostals believe they are not characterized by fleeting emotional episodes but rather by a vision characterized by 'an implicit correlation of the character of God and that of the believer, between the Holiness language of love and the Pentecostal language of power'.⁷² In this interplay, Land mentions three particular affections as indicative of Pentecostal spirituality: gratitude, compassion, and courage.⁷³

In speaking about the affections at this point, one must return to the Aristotelian paradigm concerning human behavior. As with the circularity implied in Aristotelian virtue theory, a similar circularity is implied when describing the way one is characterized and disposed regarding the spiritual life. To take the example of courage, a courageous person performs courageous acts, yet courageous acts lead one to be characterized habitually as a courageous person; therefore, a notion of Pentecostal affections, which rightly emphasizes the transforming activity of the Spirit, must be complemented by a framework of *habitus* so that the works prior to⁷⁴ and subsequent to⁷⁵ God's activity might be acknowledged and given their place. In order to address adequately the manner in which humans are characterized, one must maintain both the transformative nature of the affections and the habitual enactment of the virtues.

72. Land, *Pentecostal Spirituality*, p. 123.

73. Land, *Pentecostal Spirituality*, pp. 136-61. Interestingly, Land mentions as an aside that these are related to the theological virtues of faith, love, and hope, respectively (p. 138).

74. By works prior to God's activity, I am referring to the notion offered by Wesley in which one in some ways must perform 'works meet for repentance'. In speaking in these terms, Wesley does not in any way deny the primary and prevenient role of God's grace; however, he does believe that one should do all that one can to await in an active and anticipatory manner God's continual manifestation of His presence. For an elaboration of this theme within an account of Wesley's soteriology, see Kenneth J. Collins, *The Scripture Way of Salvation: The Heart of John Wesley's Theology* (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1997).

75. This notion beckons the understanding of Edwards in that a true experience with God must produce 'fruit' from that encounter, a notion that leads to the Wesleyan understanding of works perfecting faith.

Further to understand the notion of habituation within the virtues, one may turn to an account of practices. Moving from a modified MacIntyrean understanding of practices, namely those ‘complex social activities that pursue certain goods internal to the practices themselves’,⁷⁶ one can approach ‘Christian practices’ as ‘things Christian people do together over time to address fundamental human needs in response to and in light of God’s active presence for the life of the world’.⁷⁷ In tying these two definitions, one must realize that Christian practices are constitutive of collective Christian identity because they display in external form what has come to constitute the particular convictions of a community, and in doing so, they further characterize and shape that identity.

In the case of the scheme of Pentecostal affections offered by Land, each affection suitably can and must be correlated with certain practices that foster habituated virtues, for without a strong notion of habituation, the affections run the risk of fostering a privatized, self-subservient spirituality.⁷⁸ Although a number of practices could be correlated to the affections pointed out by Land, some are especially significant because of their loss in many contemporary Pentecostal contexts. This loss, perhaps due to an attempt by present-day Pentecostals to modernize themselves, is problematic in relation to issues of identity, for the interrelation between convictions and practices demonstrates the parameters and qualities of a community’s ethos. If a community ceases to believe or embody a particular tenet of its ethos, it has altered itself significantly in ways that may be detectable only at some point in that community’s future.⁷⁹

76. This summary of MacIntyre’s sophisticated account can be found in Craig Dykstra and Dorothy C. Bass, ‘A Theological Understanding of Christian Practices’, in Miroslav Volf and Dorothy C. Bass (eds.), *Practicing Theology: Beliefs and Practices in the Christian Life* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002), p. 20.

77. Dykstra and Bass, ‘A Theological Understanding of Christian Practices’, p. 18.

78. Land is trying to avoid this kind of danger when he defines spirituality as the ‘integration of beliefs, practices, and affections’ (*Pentecostal Spirituality*, p. 132); additionally, Land mentions that practices are ‘expressive and formative of the affections’ (*Pentecostal Spirituality*, p. 97). Despite these gestures one is left desiring more regarding the interrelationship between the two and his particular understanding of ‘practices’ and the ‘means of grace’. As with many treatments of the affections, Land’s account places more categorical emphasis on the affections than the practices that form and sustain them (an exception would be Land’s stress on prayer, a practice that is characteristic of all of the affections rather than any particular one).

79. A simple and yet universal example is the eschatological expectancy that characterized early Pentecostals, both in their lives and in their worship. Whereas critics might

To take Land's first example, the affection of gratitude can be correlated to the practice of 'sharing one's testimony'. In many early Pentecostal services, the sharing of testimonies was one of the highlights of the meetings because of the manner in which this activity demonstrated the presence of God in believers' lives. God was not distant but very near in the everyday affairs of early Pentecostals; by glorifying God for His wondrous acts, these believers not only characterized themselves individually but also collectively because of the way the sharing of testimonies was a collective practice. Testimonies are indications that believers are in a perpetual state of tarrying before the Lord, because the act of sharing the way God is present among believers inspires a vision of living 'in between the times', a vision that demonstrates the way God breaks through the experience of the church in an act foreshadowing His soon-coming reign. Gratitude is affectional because it is wrought only by the presence of God's Spirit, but one can sustain habitually this disposition by enacting it through such practices as sharing one's testimony in the context of the church's communal worship. By considering both senses, Pentecostals can more adequately understand and approach the reality of being a 'grateful people'.

With the affection of compassion, Land intends an amplified form of love, one that is similar to the understanding of charity as the chief of the virtues. If one were to elaborate this understanding, one would have to mention the holy desire for God Himself that retains the form of the true love of God and neighbor that is required of all believers. The desire to draw closer to God, to grow more amenable to His Spirit, is manifested through the practice of 'witnessing'. By 'witnessing' I intend at least two particular foci: (1) recalling in wonderment the beauty and truthfulness of God and (2) prophetically identifying the world for what it is in word and deed. Recalling the beauty of God gives prominence to the object of all worship and reminds the worshiping community that the object of its love is far more appealing and worthwhile than anything found in the world. In tarrying before Him, believers experience glimpses of God's self that

say that this was a form of 'pie-in-the-sky' escapism, this heightened eschatological fervor formed a central tenet of Pentecostal belief and practice that is now lacking among modern Pentecostals. Given the primacy of this theme, one wonders if a significant part of narrating the Pentecostal ethos today would require a reassessment of eschatology, one that takes into account the new possibilities for witness that are open to Pentecostals as members of an emerging tradition. For a suggestive step in this direction, see Larry R. McQueen, *Joel and the Spirit: The Cry of a Prophetic Hermeneutic* (JPTSup, 8; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1995), pp. 93-112.

inspire both humility and the desire for conforming to Him. Only from this context of worship can the church then participate in one of its principal tasks: identifying through word and deed what the world is.⁸⁰ This particular context of worship and witness is the one suitable for narrating the form and purpose of the particular commitments or prohibitions Pentecostals decide for themselves, for these modifications and activities stem *primarily* from a love of God and His holiness and *subsequently* from a love that desires to name the world as it exists in its present state: fallen creation in need of redemption.

Abstracting these activities from their proper context can lead to pharisaical legalism, for such an act dissociates them from the desire for God's holiness and righteousness, a desire that is an affection created in one's heart by God's revealing and transforming Spirit; correlatively, in order that antinomian or 'quietist' heresies might be equally averted, this affection must be sustained habitually by activities that witness to the beauty of God, because they in turn denounce those elements that are contradictory to this vision of love and adoration. From this context, tenets of 'practical holiness' can be discussed and negotiated properly by Pentecostals in dialogue with the subtlety and extensiveness of the world's fallen presuppositions.⁸¹

Finally, Land mentions the affection of courage, which he associates with confidence and hope, the latter two being the 'already-not yet polarities of courage'.⁸² Many modern Pentecostals might not be characterized properly as being a courageous people, partly because of an uneasy hesitancy

80. Despite her desires to influence and change the world, the church must remember that her 'responsibility to and for the world is first and always to be the church' (John Howard Yoder, *The Royal Priesthood* [Scottsdale, PA: Herald Press, 1998], p. 61). 'Being the church' implies that she be 'faithful to the story of God that makes intelligible the divided nature of the world' (Stanley Hauerwas, *A Community of Character* [Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981], p. 91). Being faithful to God through lives of tarrying before Him is the normative form for engaging in proper witness to the world.

81. In this light, modesty and sanctity can be themes in the church's life once again, particularly since most modern societies attribute value to consumptive capacities and proprietary displays of wealth. Despite the attention that these issues receive, other ones are just as important, including the assumed compatibility between the values of the nation-state and the church (an especially troubling issue for the American context—both in the church's accommodation to mass culture and in the specific embodiment of military chaplaincy)

82. Land, *Pentecostal Spirituality*, p. 158.

regarding the supernatural manifestations of the Spirit. This tension partially relates to the loss of the supernatural in many Pentecostal contexts. Given that the presence of the supernatural, including the presence of miracles, was one of the driving forces behind the movement's early growth, one wonders if a 'domestication of the Spirit' has taken place among groups who are experiencing excessive institutionalization. If this analysis is true, then courage must be an affection that all Pentecostals seek in their embodied tarrying. Only through the Spirit-formed disposition of courage can Pentecostals maintain their witness in the face of an antagonistic world. This affection can be sustained habitually through 'the laying on of hands'.⁸³ This practice of communal prayer is a confident act of Christian expectancy and solidarity that reminds believers that Christ's presence is where two or three are gathered in His name. Only in unity can the church await in hope the soon return of her Lord, and this unity must be formed by the Spirit, who works both in and through believers. Rather than assuming the modern virtues of individuality and self-reliance, Pentecostals can tarry in courage with the belief that what God has demonstrated to those who love and believe in Him will one day be fulfilled in the kingdom to come. Through the laying on of hands, Pentecostals attest to the power that accompanies the faithful when they collectively seek to embody and live out the promises of God.

Conclusion

In a variety of settings, scholars of Pentecostalism have noted that the movement has reached a crossroads, a place in which choices made at the present will affect significantly the shape and trajectory of the movement for years to come. Constitutive of this state of affairs is the search for Pentecostal identity in relation to its history and the demands and influences of the present. These debates undoubtedly will continue, but one thing is clear: as the movement becomes more and more institutionalized,⁸⁴ Pentecostals

83. For a biblical and historical treatment of this theme, see Francis A. Sullivan, 'The Laying on of Hands in Christian Tradition', in Mark W. Wilson (ed.), *Spirit and Renewal: Essays in Honor of J. Rodman Williams* (JPTSUP, 5; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1994), pp. 42-54.

84. Such a development should not sadden or dishearten the faithful, for this development is natural to all movements; in fact, for movements to be sustained, they must acquire certain qualities normally associated with institutions. The key issue is

will have to amplify their vision of *orthodoxy* and *orthopraxis*; as Pentecostals wrestle with what might be called 'Pentecostal theology', they also will wrestle with the notion of what might constitute 'Pentecostal ethics'. Both tentative fields undoubtedly will rely upon a vision of God which is actualized and embodied most appropriately within a context of worship. In seeking what might constitute the moral life, Pentecostals can look to their worship and see that implied within this activity are a number of affections and virtues that must be instilled by the Spirit as well as cultivated and habitually sustained through practices that have long characterized the movement. In this way Pentecostals may continue to live as an expectant people, as a group that by grace alone is tarrying on the Lord.

how to maintain a balance in which institutional characteristics of the movement facilitate (rather than reify or stagnate) the beliefs and practices that gave rise to the movement in the first place. For a general elaboration of these themes, see MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, p. 194.